Legal Reference Library

In COUNCIL OF THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA VS DEEPAK GUPTA, the Supreme Court has opined that if a practicing chartered accountant commits misconduct while he holds the certificate of practice issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India, he would be liable for punishment if the misconduct is proved.... Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/proved-misconduct-chartered-accountant-holds-certificate-practice-punishable-sc-read-order/

It is undisputed position before us that the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act which was handed over to the post office on 30th November, 2007 was incorrectly addressed i.e. it was addressed to the assessee’s old office at Nariman Point, Mumbai. In terms of Section 282 of the Act as existing in 2007 a notice may be served on the person named therein either by post or as if it were a summons issued by the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act provides that where any Central Act requires a document to be served by post where the expression “serve” or “given” or “sent” shall be deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting. In such cases, unless the contrary is proved which would be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post to the addressee. In this case admittedly the envelope containing the notice was wrongly addressed. Thus the presumption under Sect

In Sk. Bhikan S/o Sk. Noor Mohd. Vs Mehamoodabee w/o Sk. Afzal & Ors, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that when the Court is called upon to interpret the documents and examine its effect, it involves questions of law. It is, therefore, obligatory upon the High Court to decide such questions on merits. In this case, the High Court could do so after framing substantial questions of law as required under Section 100 of the Code. It was, however, not done.

In Rajesh Kumar V. National Insurance Company Limited and Ors, revision petition has been filed before NCDRC against the impugned order passed by Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in Appeal No. 1192/2014, vide which, order passed by District Forum Kurukshetra, partly allowing complaint No. 24/2013, filed by present Petitioner, was set aside. State Commission held that there was fundamental breach of terms and conditions of policy on part of complainant, as vehicle was being used as a taxi. Perusal of reply filed by OP Insurance Company before District Forum and orders passed by State Commission as well as District Forum reveals that after alleged incident, an FIR was registered by father of the Complainant before the local police, in which it was stated that three persons came to Complainant, when he was standing at the taxi stand. He settled a fare of Rs. 700/- with them for taking them to Ambala Cantt. However, when they were on their way, occupants of the car sn

In Secretary/Manager, Mayyanad Regional Co-Operative Bank v. Ebrahimkutty, appeal has been filed against the impugned order passed by Kerala State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission vide which, Consumer Complaint No. C-05/13, filed by present Respondent, was allowed and Appellant/opposite party (OP) was directed to return the original sale deed number 1959/92 to complainant within one month, failing which to provide compensation of 10 lakh with interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of petition till realisation. In facts of case, complainant/respondent availed a loan from Appellant, by mortgaging his property. Complainant repaid his loan, but OP Bank did not return the original title deed. It has been stated that the Bank orally informed him in the year 1999 that the original deed was missing, and the OP Bank was on search to recover the same. Complainant stated that, property was valued at about Rs. 75 lakhs and due to lack of original document, complainant was unable to sell propert

In Jayakantham & Others v. Abaykumar, the appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court arises from a judgment rendered by a Single Judge of Madras High Court. Dismissing second appeal, Single Judge confirmed judgment of Principal District Judge, by which an appeal against judgment of Sub-Judge was dismissed. Trial court decreed suit for specific performance instituted by Respondent against Appellants. Appellants submitted that this is a fit and proper case where specific performance ought not to be ordered and a decree for compensation in lieu thereof would meet the ends of justice. Section 20(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 indicates that, jurisdiction to decree specific performance is discretionary. Yet, discretion of Court is not arbitrary but is “sound and reasonable”, to be “guided by judicial principles”. Exercise of discretion is capable of being corrected by a Court of appeal in hierarchy of appellate Courts. Sub-section 2 of Section 20 of Act contains a stipulation of tho

In R (on application of Hicks and others) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis-United Kingdom, four appellants were part of a larger group of claimants, but it was agreed before the Court of Appeal that their cases should be treated as test cases. They were arrested in separate incidents at various places in central London on the grounds that their arrest was reasonably believed by the arresting officers to be necessary to prevent an imminent breach of the peace. Administrative Court rejected the broad complaint that the police adopted an unlawful policy for the policing of the royal wedding. After close examination of the facts of the individual arrests, it also held that the arresting officers had good grounds to believe that the arrests were necessary in order to prevent the likelihood of an imminent breach of the peace. Claim that the police acted unlawfully as a matter of domestic law therefore failed. Court of Appeal also concluded that, Appellants were arrested and detain

In Satish Dharmu Rathod v. The State of Maharashtra, the complainant in her FIR lodged at the Cantonment Police Station on 9.10.2015 had alleged that while cohabitation at matrimonial home, she was subjected to maltreatment and harassment by the applicant on account of demand of money as well as domestic cause. Pursuant to the FIR, setting the criminal law in motion and the IO proceeded to record the statement of witnesses acquainted with the facts of the case. Meanwhile, the applicants approached the High Court praying to quash and set aside the impugned FIR, filed by the complainant contending that the Cantonment Police Station, Aurangabad had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate into the crime as no part of crime was shown committed within its territorial limits  as the alleged offences were shown to be committed at Kandhar and Mumbai. The Court found no force in the argument stating that the FIR deserved to be quashed on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of t

Clearing the way for homebuyers planning to file complaints against builders in the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) through an association route, the Supreme Court on Tuesday has made it clear this is well within their rights and the focus should be on addressing their grievances. The decision also marks significance since it would remove multiplicity of cases for state and national consumer forums and allow homebuyers to directly approach the national commission by forming a registered association, saving their time and money. Dismissing multiple appeals filed by Amrapali Sapphire Developer challenging the right of a registered consumer association to file a complaint on behalf of multiple buyers of the same project, the apex court observed that it is the grievances of homebuyers that needs to be looked into, informed Sahil Sethi, senior associate at law firm Saikrishna & Associates, who represented the Amrapali Sapphire Flat Buyers Welfare Association

In Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors. Vs. State of Haryana and Ors., rejecting the application of Maruti Udyog Ltd. to be impleaded into the matter as it was a necessary party, the Hon'ble Supreme Court said that The acquisition may either be for a 'public purpose' as defined under Section 3(f) or for a company under Part-VII of the Act. If the acquisition is for a public purpose (as the present case), the land vests in the State after the collector makes an award and the possession is taken. "Till the award is made, no person other than State comes into the picture. Once the land vests in the State, the acquisition is complete. Any transferee from the State is not concerned with the process of acquisition," the bench said. It said that the state may transfer the land by public auction or by allotment at any price and the person whose land is acquired has no concern at all. "The mere fact that the Government chooses to determine the allotment price with refere

The Supreme Court has held that an interim order made before, during or even after an award by an arbitrator will continue in force till the award is enforced. Interpreting Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the court stated so in the appeal of UltraTech Cement Ltd against the judgment of the Rajasthan High Court which had ruled in favour of the state Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd. In this case, the two parties signed an agreement by which UltraTech was allowed to take away fly ash free for five years and thereafter at the rate fixed by the Nigam. After a few years, the Nigam invited tenders for sale of fly ash. The cement company moved the civil court seeking a restraint. The judge allowed it. But the Rajasthan High Court set it aside.  The cement company moved the Supreme Court, pointing out that arbitration was pending and therefore the rate should not be changed. The court passed an interim order restricting the sale of fly ash. After the award, the question arose wh

In Member Secretary, Teliamura Nagar Panchayat vs Shri Samar Bhusan Sarkar, The first bench of Tripura High Court has directed all trial judges in the state to “remain alive” at the time of recording evidence and to actively participate in the process and to control the criminal trial by such active participation to find out the truth and to ensure justice.

The Supreme Court, in CBI vs. Sadhu Ram Singla, has observed that judicial restraint need to be observed while quashing criminal cases of non-compoundable nature on the basis of settlement arrived between the parties. “Encroaching into the right of the other organ of the government would tantamount to clear violation of the rule of law, which is one of the basic structures of the Constitution of India,” observed the bench comprising Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose and Justice Amitava Roy while dismissing an appeal by the Central Bureau of Investigation. The appeal was preferred by the CBI against the Punjab and Haryana High Court order quashing an FIR in cheating and forgery case on the basis of a compromise arrived between the accused and the complainant bank. Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/observe-judicial-restraint-quashing-non-compoundable-criminal-cases-sc/

A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court in PRAMOD KUMAR Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH  held this court cannot sit over the decision of statutory authority and discharge the functions of an appellate authority. The petitioner instead of approaching the higher authorities straight away moved the high court to challenge the decision of the district collector pertained to construction of the panchayat building. A division bench comprising of Acting Chief Justice Rajendra Menon and Justice HP Singh said “the Collector being a statutory authority, if has taken a decision, this Court cannot sit over the decision of the statutory authority and discharge the functions of an appellate authority”.... Article referred: http://www.livelaw.in/hc-cant-discharge-functions-appellate-authority-decision-statutory-authority-mp-hc/

In Satish Dharmu Rathod vs The State of Maharashtra the Bombay High Court has held that a criminal investigation cannot be quashed on the ground that the investigating officer has no territorial jurisdiction. It was alleged in the petition that the police of cantonment police station, Aurangabad, had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate into the crime as no part of crime is shown committed within the territorial limits of Cantonment Police Station, Aurangabad. The alleged offence of cruelty and criminal intimidation etc. are shown to have been committed at Kandhar and Mumbai. Therefore, the FIR registered at Cantonment Police Station, Aurangabad, deserves to be quashed and set aside for lack of jurisdiction to investigate into the crime, the petition said. The high court held that sub-section (2) of Section 156 of CrPC stated that no proceeding of police officer in any stage shall, be called in question on the ground that the case was one which the officer was not empower

In PROCTER & GAMBLE HOME PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED vs HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LTD., the Delhi High Court has held that comparative advertising, i.e., comparing own product with that of competitor’s and calling own superior / better than competitor‘s, would not amount to disparaging the goods/products of the other. Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw dismissed all three suits between Procter & Gamble Home Products Private Limited and Hindustan Unilever Ltd., claiming disparagement of goods of the plaintiff in the suit by the defendant in television commercials (TVC) of its goods and seeking relief of injunction and damages. The subject advertisement in each of the suit indisputably compares the two products and though does not name the product of the other but, besides showing the sachet of the advertiser‘s own product, shows sachet of the other‘s product. Dismissing all the suits, after referring to various decisions, foreign and that of various high courts on the law of disparaging adver

The Karnataka High Court in Hussain vs. Imtiyan Khan has held that a legal representative of a claimant cannot challenge the award and she does not inherit the right to prosecute the appeal after death of the claimant. The legal representative of the claimant had contended that when insurance company files an appeal challenging the award of the tribunal, if a legal representative of the injured can be permitted to come on record on the death of injured during the pendency of the appeal, the same is to be permitted when the injured files an appeal and dies subsequently. Justice Sreenivas Harish Kumar said: “If he had not died, he could have prosecuted the appeal seeking enhancement of compensation. The moment he died, his wife is only entitled to recover the compensation granted by the tribunal. Right to prosecute an appeal being a legal representative is not heritable. If it is possible to make out the cause of death as due to personal injuries owing to accident, the wife gets a ri

In Manik Lal Bhowmik Vs. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited, the Calcutta High Court has held that a charge sheet issued against an employee in a disciplinary proceedings, the enquiry report and the letter of dismissal are protected by qualified proceedings, the enquiry report and the letter of dismissal are protected by qualified privilege. However, in the facts of the case two questions arise on the answer of which will depend the success or failure of this suit. Firstly, has the suit been filed within the time period specified in the Limitation Act, 1963? Secondly, assuming that the answer to the first question is in favour of the plaintiff, is the defence of absolute or qualified privilege available to the defendant? Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides that subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence

In Haryana Urban Dev. Authority and Ors. Vs. Orchid Infrastructure Developers P. Ltd., the Respondent filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief as against the Appellants with regard to rejection of bid relating to the commercial tower when the bid submitted by the Respondent was the highest. Plaintiff questioned the rejection of the bid. The question before the court was - (i) Whether there being no concluded contract in absence of acceptance of bid and issuance of allotment letter, suit could be said to be maintainable for declaratory relief and mandatory injunction sought by Plaintiff (ii)  Whether Administrator had rejected bid in illegal or arbitrary manner Held, while allowing the appeal: (i) The Respondent prayed for a declaration that rejection of the bid was illegal. Merely by that, Plaintiff could not have become entitled for consequential mandatory injunction for issuance of formal letter of allotment. Court while exercising judicial review could not have a

In Sandeep Khanuja vs Atul Dande & Anr, the Hon'ble Supreme Court while increasing the compensation of the accident victim held that We may observe at the outset that it is now a settled principle, repeatedly stated and restated time and again by this Court, that in awarding compensation the multiplier method is logically sound and legally well established. This method, known as 'principle of multiplier', has been evolved to quantify the loss of income as a result of death or permanent disability suffered in an accident. Recognition to this principle was given for the first time in the year 1966 in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Subhagwanti & Ors.[1] What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (by

The Supreme Court in Munshi Lal vs. Smt. Santosh, has observed that if a tenant enters into a partnership agreement with his son-in-law and allows him to occupy the tenanted premises, without obtaining the consent of the landlord, it cannot be said that there is no parting of possession. The high court in the instant case had upheld the view taken by the appellate authority, which had relied on Smt. Krishnawati Vs. Shri Hans Raj (1974) 1 SCC 289, in which it was held that in an arrangement where the premises was rented by the husband, and the wife was allowed to carry out business in a part of the premises, would not amount to subletting. “In this case, the relationship is not like that of a spouse being allowed to carry out a business in the same house. The relationship is of a son-in-law and father-in-law who had entered into a partnership agreement,” a bench comprising Justice SA Bobde and Justice L Nageswara Rao said. The court, referring to provisions of the Delhi Rent Contr

In Ashoke Kumar vs PNB, the Hon'ble Allahabad HC while quashing the proceedings initiated post notice under Section 13(4) of The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 as the said notice was issued without duly informing the debtor about the auction of property and subsequent sale. Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi was hearing a petition filed by one Ashok Kumar who sought quashing of an order by the Debt Recovery Appellate Tribunal(DRAT) dated March 6, 2013 wherein an appeal against the order of the Debt Recovery Tribunal(DRT) was dismissed. According to the order, the petitioner was serving in Punjab National Bank,Varanasi. During his service period, he took a housing loan of Rs.10 lacs in 2007 for construction of a house and deposited title deed of a property in his village in Varanasi as security. Then the petitioner defaulted in payment of instalments. Consequently, Ashok Kumar’s loan account was declared as ‘No

The Supreme Court in Prabhakara Adiga vs. Gowri, has held that a decree for injunction can also be executed against legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor, in view of the specific provisions contained in section 50 of the Code of Procedure. A bench comprising Justice Arun Mishra and Justice Amitava Roy observed that when the right litigated upon is heritable, the decree would not normally abate and can be enforced by legal representatives of decree-holder and against the judgment-debtor or his legal representatives. It would be against the public policy to ask the decree-holder to litigate once over again against the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor when the cause and injunction survives, the bench said. The bench set aside a Karnataka High Court judgment which had held that the decree for permanent injunction cannot be enforced against the legal heirs of judgment-debtor, as injunction does not travel with land. The bench noted that the maxim “actio pe

In ASHOK KUMAR SINGH vs UNIVERSITY OF DELHI AND ORS., the Hon'ble Delhi High Court has held that the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, must give a definite conclusion regarding the guilt of the person involved in the incident. Justice Valmiki Mehta was hearing a petition filed by Ashok Kumar Singh against the report of Internal Complaints Committee of Dayal Singh Evening College on account of complaints against him.

The Supreme Court, in Commissioner Of Customs, Mumbai Vs M/S Aban Loyd Chiles Offshore Ltd, has held that mere repair of a vessel is not putting the vessel to use in India and would not result in home consumption, so as to constitute a taxable import. A bench comprising Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Prafulla C Pant dismissed the appeals filed against the tribunal order, which held that the rig cannot be said to have been imported into India when it had anchored twice in 1996 and once in 1998 for the purpose of repair, for the element of home consumption is missing even when the vessel, i.e., the rig, had entered the territorial waters.

The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in M/S. AERO CLUB (WOODLAND) vs RAKESH SHARMA, recently ruled that shops cannot charge extra VAT on items sold on discounted price, observing that the MRP on the product includes all taxes, and hence it was not open for the trader to impose VAT again on the discounted price. The question to be considered by the Commission was whether the Petitioners had indulged in unfair trade practice by charging VAT on the discounted merchandise, despite having announced a discount of “FLAT* 40%” on selected merchandise, which in actual terms works out to less than 40% of the MRP.

In response to an application related to Supriya Paul vs State, the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court has come down strongly against the petitioner and their advocate for filling multiple petition for similar relief. The Hon'ble court while issuing rule of contempt against Petitioners said that the Petitioners’ conduct amounted to an “abuse of process of Court”. The Petitioners had demanded transfer of criminal cases to any other competent Court, even though a similar relief had been rejected in earlier proceedings. The Court further referred the matter to the Bar Council of West Bengal for initiating appropriate disciplinary proceeding against the lawyer, Mr. Kamal Kanti Kar “for repeatedly instituting frivolous and vexatious proceeding for and on behalf of his client for the selfsame relief when such relief had been turned down by this Court with costs in an earlier proceeding wherein he had represented the said litigants.”

The Supreme Court, in Nidhi Vs. Ram Kripal Sharma, has held that the marriage of a landlady as subsequent event cannot extinguish the bona fide requirement of a landlady urged in a release application filed prior to her marriage. Being married and shifting to other place does not automatically result in extinguishing of bona fide requirement of the appellant, as being the owner of property, she alone is to decide what she wants to do with her property, a bench comprising  Justice Dipak Misra and Justice R Banumathi observed, while setting aside a high court order, which had held otherwise. The court observed that for the purpose of coming to the conclusion on bona fide need of the landlord, comparative hardship to the parties will have to be taken into consideration.  The bench said the landlady has established her bona fide requirement for accommodating her parents and grandparents in the suit premises and merely because she got married amidst the proceedings, it does not e

Our conclusions are crystallised as under: (i) The words “for his own use” as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction. (ii) The expression — landlord requires for “his own use”, is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal “emanations” of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as interrelationship and interdependence — economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they belong. (iii) The te

The Supreme Court, in State Of Himachal Pradesh vs. Satpal Saini, has set aside certain directions to amend a tenancy law, issued by Himachal Pradesh High Court to the state, reiterating that the court in its judicial review cannot encroach upon the basic constitutional function which is entrusted to the legislature to determine whether a law should be enacted or amended. The Himachal Pradesh High Court, while allowing a writ petition, had issued directed the state to amend the provisions of of the Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, and the Rules. The state challenged these ‘directions’ before the apex court. A bench comprising Justice AM Sapre and Justice DY Chandrachud observed that the high court cannot direct the legislature either to enact a law or to amend a law which it has enacted for the simple reason that this constitutional function lies in the exclusive domain of the legislature. For the Court to mandate an amendment of a law – as did the Himachal Prad

High Court of Delhi B.B. Dash v. Central Information Commission and Anr. Right to Information CPIO is to give sufficient reasons for denying supply of information on account of it being exempt Petitioner impugns order dated 22th November, 2016, whereby, CIC has held Petitioner – CPIO liable for not providing information to Respondents. It has been held that, Petitioner has failed to provide information without any cogent reasons. Maximum penalty, as prescribed, of Rs.25,000/- has been imposed on Petitioner. In facts of present case, Respondent No.2 had filed an application under Right to Information Act, 2005 dated 25th August, 2015 seeking certain information. Reply to said information was given. Since Respondent No.2 was not satisfied with reply given, a complaint under Section 18 of Right to Information Act, 2005 was filed with CIC. Said complaint under Section 18 of Act culminated in proceedings under Section 20 of Act leading to impugned order dated 22nd November, 2016.

High Court of Delhi Mrs. Aradhna Goel v. Balwantray Mehta Vidya Bhawan & Anr. Employer has to judge suitability of services of probationer; Court cannot substitute its decision for that of employer By this writ petition, Petitioner impugns order of the Delhi School Tribunal, by which Delhi School Tribunal dismissed appeal filed by Petitioner against the termination of her services by Respondent no.1/school’s letter dated 4th May, 2007. Petitioner was appointed as a probationer with Respondent no.1/school by letter of Respondent no.1 dated 15th July, 2006. Termination of employment of Petitioner was during probationary period, and dehors any other aspect which is in issue, it is settled law that it is employer who has to judge suitability of services of a probationer and this Court cannot substitute its decision for that of the employer, and if employer for any reason does not find probationer to be suitable for services, such services of a probationer can be terminated in a

Supreme Court Ganga Ram Sah and Ors. v. State of Bihar In facts of present case, Appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code,1860 (IPC) and rest of accused persons were also sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for offence punishable under Section 302/109 of IPC. Against conviction, these accused persons had preferred two criminal appeals heard together by the High Court and have resulted in dismissal, since High Court has affirmed the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court. FIR was registered on basis of fardbayan given by informant immediately after the incident. There is no time lag between incident and FIR. In said FIR, both Appellant Nos. 1 and 3 are specifically named. Insofar as Appellant No. 1 is concerned, specific allegation is made in FIR that it was the exhortation of Appellant No. 1 which led to the said assault. Accused fired two gun shots hitting brother

In Sri Vasunathan vs The Registrar,[General Writ Petition No. 62038 of 2016] the Karnataka HC in it’s judgement and order has dealt with the “right to be forgotten” on the internet in India. This post contains a background and analysis of the case. Facts The daughter of the petitioner had filed a complaint, Crime No. 376/2014, resulting in an FIR under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, resulting in a subsequent charge-sheet was filed. In the meantime, the daughter of the petitioner also filed a civil suit O.S. No. 168/2014 seeking a declaration that there was no marriage between her and the defendant in the said suit and subsequent annulment of marriage certificate issued was prayed for. A compromise was reached amongst both parties. One of the conditions in the compromise reached were that the daughter of the plaintiff had to take all necessary steps to withdraw and terminate the criminal complaint. Pursuant to the compromise, a petition was filed in the crimi

In the Internet age access to information is quick and procuring personal information or antecedents of an individual is much easier. Acknowledging this fact and the sensitive nature of case in hand, the Karnataka High Court in a landmark judgment recently  Sri Vasunathan vs The Registrar General, has accepted, applied and approved the ‘Right to be Forgotten’ in Indian context. The “right to be forgotten” or “the right to be erased” allows an individual to request for removal of his/her personal information/data online. The origin of this right can be traced back to the French jurisprudence on the ‘right to oblivion’ or droit à l’oubli. The rationale behind it was to allow offenders who had served their sentence to object to the publication of information regarding their crime and conviction in order to ease their process of social integration. these lines that the European Union Data Protection Directive, 1995 acknowledged the right to be forgotten, wherein it was stipulated that th

A two Judge bench of the Supreme Court  in AMRUTBHAI SHAMBHUBHAI PATEL vs SUMANBHAI KANTIBHAI PATEL & ORS,  held that Magistrate cannot order further investigation after the cognizance has been taken, process has been issued and accused has entered appearance in response thereto. The Bench comprising Justices Dipak Misra and Amitava Roy held that though the investigating agency concerned has been invested with the power to undertake further investigation desirably after informing the Court thereof, before which it had submitted its report and obtaining its approval, no such power is available therefore to the Magistrate after cognizance has been taken on the basis of the earlier report, process has been issued and accused has entered appearance in response thereto. “At that stage, neither the Magistrate suo motu nor on an application filed by the complainant/informant direct further investigation. Such a course would be open only on the request of the investigating agency and t

The bench of Dipak Misra and R. Banumathi, JJ held that the brother of a married female tenant is neither a ‘heir’ as visualized under Section 3(a) nor ‘family’ within the meaning of Section 3(g) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972. In the present case, the suit property was taken on rent by the father-in-law of deceased tenant and after his death, his son became tenant of the suit property. Upon his death, his wife i.e. the appellant’s sister became the tenant of the suit property. The Court noticed that the word ‘heir’ is not defined in the Act and hence, it has to be given the same meaning as would be applicable to the general law of succession. Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act lays down the general order of succession to the property of a female intestate who dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act and the exception carved out in Section 15(2)(b) provides for a special order of succession in case of property inher