Legal Reference Library

In Rajesh Projects (India) Pvt. Ltd vs. CIT, the issue before the Delhi High Court was the nature of the payments made towards lease. Do they constitute rent so as to attract Section 194-I? The court is of opinion that clearly these payments are not “rent”. That they are annual payments cannot be doubted. Yet, part of the payment is clearly capital in nature. Clause 1 of the lease deeds entered into in each of the cases, clearly points to the fact that a small percentage of the agreed amounts were paid as part of the lease premium and were towards acquisition of the asset; they fell, consequently in the capital stream and were not “rents”. The balance of such premium payments were spread over a period of 8 to 10 years, in specified annual or bi-annual installments. Here, distinction between a single payment made at the time of the settlement of the demised property and recurring payments made during the period of its enjoyment by the lessee is to be made. This distinction is clearly re

In Mother Hospital Pvt. Ltd vs. CIT, the Supreme Court held that We are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Building which was constructed by the firm belonged to the firm. Admittedly it is an immovable property. The title in the said immovable property cannot pass when its value is more than Rs.100/- unless it is executed on a proper stamp paper and is also duly registered with the sub-Registrar. Nothing of the sort took place. In the absence thereof, it could not be said that the assessee had become the owner of the property. As is clear from the plain language of the Explanation, it is only when the assessee holds a lease right or other right of occupancy and any capital expenditure is incurred by the assesee on the construction of any structure or doing of any work in or in relation to and by way of renovation or extension of or improvement to the building and the expenditure on construction is incurred by the assessee, that assessee would be entitled to depreciatio

In Anita. D. Kanjani Vs ACIT, the ITAT Mumbai held that The mere fact that possession was delivered later, would not detract from the fact that assessee (allottee) was conferred a right to hold the property on issuance of an allotment letter. The payment of balance amount and delivery of possession are consequential acts that relate back to and arise from the rights conferred by the allotment letter upon the assessee. Holding period should be computed from the date of issue of allotment If we do so, the holding period becomes more than 36 months and consequently, the property sold by the assessee would be long term capital asset in the hands of the assessee and the gain on sale of the same would be taxable in the hands of the assessee as Long Term Capital Gain. Article referred: http://taxguru.in/income-tax/property-holding-period-should-be-computed-from-allotment-letter-date.html#sthash.Z8TxegiO.dpuf

In Red Chillies Entertainment Pvt. Ltd. Vs Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax,  ITAT Mumbai held that the very fact that the assessee abandoned the projects goes to prove that the projects were not found to be viable or workable. Therefore, keeping in view the business interest, the assessee decided to abandon the projects. In fact, in the CBDT circular no.16 of 6th October 2015, the Board has clearly stated that cost incurred in abandoned projects should be allowed as revenue expenditure under section 37 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, we allow assessee’s claim of deduction. Article referred: http://taxguru.in/income-tax/red-chillies-entertainment-pvt-asstt-commissioner-income-tax-itat-mumbai.html#sthash.Qlrad9gT.dpuf

In M/s Singh Caterers & Vendors & Anr. v. Indian Railways Catering And Tourism Corporation Ltd., writ petition has been filed challenging termination letter passed by Respondent-IRCTC terminating temporary license awarded to Petitioners for management of On Board Catering Services in Train on ground that, Petitioners had failed to accept award of temporary license and had not paid the security deposit and license fee within stipulated time. Respondent in terms of Clause 4.8 of tender document also debarred Petitioners from participating in future projects of Respondent, IRCTC for a period of one year and forfeited Standing Earnest Money Deposit (SEMD) of Rs.3 lakhs. High Court is of view that cutting/overwriting in present case is not a violation of a mandatory condition and is not material as there is no ambiguity or discrepancy in bid amount. Petitioners bid despite cutting/overwriting clearly mentions the revised bid amount. In fact, revised bid amount has been mentioned c

In Syed Mansoor Hasan Rizvi Vs Director, Local Bodies, the Allahabad High Court has held that the departmental proceedings are quasi judicial proceedings and the inquiry officer functions as quasi judicial officer. “He is not merely a representative of the department. He has to act as an independent and impartial officer to find out the truth,” said Justice Devendra Kumar Arora while quashing a dismissal order passed by inquiry officer in a departmental inquiry. “The major punishment awarded to an employee visit serious civil consequences and as such the departmental proceedings ought to be in conformity with the principles of natural justice. Even if, an employee prefers not to participate in inquiry the department has to establish the charges against the employee by adducing oral as well as documentary evidence. In case charges warrant major major punishment then the oral evidence by producing the witnesses is necessary,” said the court.

In  MURJIBHAI VISHRAM VARSANI Vs SALEMAMAD JUMA SAMEJA, the Gujarat High Court has ruled that an unregistered partnership firm can file a criminal complaint for a dishonoured cheque under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The HC clarified this position while dealing with three cases involving a similar issue. This was because various high courts had passed contrary orders. The issue was whether section 69(2) of the Partnership Act bars an unregistered firm from lodging such a criminal complaint. Citing orders passed by various high courts and the Supreme Court, Justice J B Pardiwala concluded that section 69(2) of the Act does not prohibit an unregistered partnership firm from filing a criminal complaint. "The said section has no application to criminal cases. Under these circumstances it could be said that Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act is applicable only where the civil rights are invoked and not in criminal cases. Non-registration of the firm has no legal

In Berger Paints India Ltd. Vs. C.I.T., Delhi-V,  the short question before the Supreme Court was  whether “premium” collected by the appellant-Company on its subscribed share capital is “capital employed in the business of the Company” within the meaning of Section 35D of the Act so as to enable the Company to claim deduction of the said amount as prescribed under Section 35D of the Act? While dismissing the appeal the Hon'ble court held that as rightly pointed out by the learned Attorney General appearing for the Revenue, the Companies Act provides in its Schedule V- Part II (Section 159) a Form of Annual Return, which is required to be furnished by the Company having share capital every year. Column III of this Form, which deals with capital structure of the company, provides the break up of “issued shares capital break up“. This column does not include in it the “premium amount collected by the company from its shareholders on its issued share capital“. This is indicative of

Himachal Pradesh Financial Corporation Vs. Anil Garg The Respondent applied for a loan of Rs.1.90 lakhs in 1989 to purchase a Swaraz Mazda truck and executed a hypothecation deed. Repayment schedule commenced from 10.1.1990 culminating on 10.7.1994. Rs.10,000/- only was repaid on 6.3.1991. The vehicle was seized on 6.5.1991 under Section 29 of the State Finance Corporation Act, 1951 and auction sold on 4.9.1991 for a sum of Rs.1.46 lakhs. A Money Suit was filed before the Senior Sub Judge, Shimla for recovery of the balance of Rs.1,25,270/- along with future interest and costs. The Suit was withdrawn on 12.12.1995 under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure stating that the Appellant desired to proceed under the Himachal Pradesh Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1973. The Suit was dismissed as withdrawn. Recovery Certificate was then issued under the Act on 19.4.1996 for a sum of Rs.1,94,283/- followed by a warrant of arrest. 7. The Respondent thwarted the Certifi

The Supreme Court, in Union of India vs. Besco Ltd, has held that even if an arbitrator is specified in the agreement for arbitration, the chief justice or the designated judge is free to appoint an independent arbitrator, having due regard to the qualification, if circumstances so warrant. A bench comprising Justice Kurian Joseph and Justice R Banumathi upheld a high court judgment which had nominated an independent arbitrator, on the ground that petitioner (before the high court) had lost the mandate to appoint an arbitrator since it failed to appoint the arbitrator within the permitted time. Referring to some decisions in this aspect, the court observed: “Though an arbitrator is specified in the agreement for arbitration, if circumstances so warrant, the Chief Justice or the designated Judge is free to appoint an independent arbitrator, having due regard to the qualification, if any, and other aspects as required under Section 11(8) of the Act.” The court also, in the facts of

The allegation of fraud and collusion between the counsel for opposite parties, after many years, ipso facto does not render the decree invalid, the Supreme Court has observed in M/s Brakewel Automotive Components (India) Pvt Ltd vs PR Selvam Alagappan. One of the contention by the judgment debtor in an execution proceedings was that the decree is an yield of fraud and collusion between the counsel appearing for the parties, it is non-est in law and thus, the impugned order which only permits an inquiry in these aspects, is well within the purview of Section 47 CPC and therefore, no interference therewith is called for. According to the judgment debtor, on receiving the summons in the suit, necessary instructions were conveyed to his counsel in Delhi to appropriately contest the proceeding, but the latter refrained from either filing the written statement or from taking necessary steps resulting in his default for which ... ultimately, the suit was decreed ex-parte. His appeal, th

The Bombay High Court in Mr Sanjay Sadanand Varrier v/s M/s Power Horse India Pvt.Ltd. has held that a winding up petition filed by an employee under Section 439 r/w sections 433(e) and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, as a creditor based on the claim of recovery of his unpaid salary and wages is maintainable. A division bench of Justice SC Dharmadhikari and Justice BP Colabawalla was hearing a company petition placed before them by the Chief Justice after a single judge in this matter took a different view from the one taken by another single judge in the case of Mumbai Labour Union vs M/s Indo French Time Industries Ltd. Petitioner Sanjay Varrier contended that from October 2009 till his resignation in March 2012, the respondent company did not pay him salary. Failing to reply .to the statutory notice sent by the petitioner under S. 434 of the Companies Act, the winding up petition was filed. While the respondent company relied on the decision of a single judge of the high court i

Order 2 Rule 2 of Code of Civil Procedure Suit to include the whole claim.- (1) Every suit shall include the whole of the claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action; but a plaintiff may relinquish any portion of his claim in order to bring the suit within the jurisdiction of any Court. (2) Relinquishment of part of claim—Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of his claim, he shall not afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished. (3) Omission to sue for one of several reliefs—A person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs, but if he omits except with the leave of the court, to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Restating the law laid down in Gurbux Singh vs. Bhooralal, the Supreme Court, in Jayantilal Chimanlal Patel vs. Vadilal Purushottamdas Patel,

Order 7 Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure Rejection of plaint.- The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:— (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so; (c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where it is not filed in duplicate; (f) where the plaintiff fails comply with the provision of Rule 9. The Supreme Court, in Kuldeep Singh Pathania vs. Bikram Singh Jarya, has held that for an enquiry under Order VII Rule 11 (a) of Code of Civil Procedure, only the pleadings of the plaintiff can b

The Supreme Court, in Canara Bank vs. M. Amarender Reddy, has held that it is permissible to simultaneously issue notice to the borrower about the intention to sell the secured assets and also to issue a public notice for sale of such secured asset by inviting tenders from the public or by holding public auction. The high court, in the instant case, had observed that after a notice regarding intention to sell the secured asset under sub-rule 6 of Rule 8 is given by the authorised officer to the borrower, only on expiry of 30 days therefrom can the secured creditor take a decision about the mode of sale referred to in sub-rule 5 of Rule 8 the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002, after giving notice to the borrower and then issue a public notice after expiry of further 30 days. By this interpretation, the high court has virtually re-written the provisions and inevitably extended the time frame of 30 days specified in sub-rule 6 of Rule 8, said the three-judge bench headed by

The Madhya Pradesh High Court in SHRI RAWATPURA SARKAR LOK KALYAN TRUST Vs SHRI SHRINAGARDHAM UDASEEN ASHRAM NIJI NYAS SIRSAWAN CHITRAKOOT has held that re-cross examination of the witnesses under Order 18 and Rule 17 of Civil Procedure Code after evidence is closed is permissible in a civil suit. The trial court had dismissed the application of the petitioner for re-cross examination of the witness  after evidence is closed on ground that the petitioner could not file the application under Order 18 and Rule 17 of the CPC to re-cross examine the witnesses as the power to recall the witnesses for the same is vested only with it.

The Calcutta High Court, in PS Mitra vs Manor Travels Private Limited, has held that a judgment and order of conviction and sentence of imprisonment till the rising of the Court and an order of compensation imposed under Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a direction to undergo imprisonment in default of payment of such compensation is appealable. The petitioner was convicted for commission of offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and sentenced to suffer imprisonment till the rising of the Court and directed to pay compensation to the tune of Rs.4 lakhs within one month in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two years. Initially, the petitioner preferred a revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Calcutta and thereafter made an application for converting such revision into an appeal on the premise that the imprisonment for two years prescribed in default of payment of compensation is appealab

Cheque; Sarafudheen Vs. T. Muhammed Ashraf [Kerala High Court, 15-07-2016]  Case Law Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act Michael Kuruvilla v. Joseph J. Kondody, 1998 (1) KLT 384 Babu Lal v. Kewal Chand, 2008 (1) Crimes 147 (MP) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Ss. 9 & 138 – ‘self cheque’ – holder in due course – cheque was issued in the form of a “self cheque” – at the same time, it is a bearer cheque also, since the terms “or bearer” has not been scored off – therefore, cheque could be treated as a “bearer cheque” – therefore, when cheque is a “bearer cheque”, the possessor of the cheque for consideration can be termed as a “holder in due course”. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Ss. 9 & 118 (g) – holder of the cheque – when it is admitted that the complainant is the holder of the cheque, the presumption under Section 118(g) of the N.I.Act is available to the complainant. It shall be presumed that the complainant being the holder of the cheque is the hold

In The State of Maharashtra V/s. Smt. Kamaladevi Kailashchandra Kaushal, the Bombay High Court after 21 Years hiked compensation amount awarded by MACT. Justice MS Sonak was hearing an appeal filed by the state and others against the MACT order dated August 5, 1995.  In the MACT order, the appellants were directed to jointly pay a compensation of Rs.1,65,000 to the widow, mother and children of the deceased. In the appeal among the points raised before the High Court was whether in the absence of any cross appeal or cross objections on the part of the claimants, the appeal court is entitled to award ‘just compensation’ to the claimants, in the appeal instituted by the owner? Referring to the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ningamma and anr. vs. United India Insurance Company Limited, (2009) the High Court held that section 166 of the MV Act deals with “just compensation” and even if in the pleadings no specific claim was made, a party should not be deprived

The Allahabad High Court in Bimal Kumar S/o Arun Kumar Dixit vs State of U.P.  has held that when an acquittal was obtained by playing fraud upon the court, it is no acquittal in the eyes of law, and in such a case the bar of Section 362 CrPC would not come into play. Justice Anil Kumar Srivastava made this observation while disposing of a challenge against an order by the trial court wherein it recalled its acquittal order after it came to know that fraud was played upon the court by impersonating the witnesses. The trial court ordered a fresh trial be held from the stage of recording of prosecution witnesses. The accused challenged this order of the trial court, relying on Section 362 CrPC, contending that once a judgment has been delivered, the same cannot be reopened by the trial court. Negating the challenge, the court observed: “If the acquittal was obtained by playing fraud upon the Court, it is no acquittal in the eyes of law and no sanctity or credibility can be attached

The Madhya Pradesh in NAVAL KISHORE GATTANI Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH held that while exercising jurisdiction of section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code this court cannot indulge in a “roving inquiry” to ascertain the two conflicting versions concerned to any incident whether it is correct or not. Furthermore the court held it is the sole domain of the trial court to enquire and deduce to the truth of two conflicting versions relating to the incident one given by the petitioner and the other by the prosecution.

The Supreme Court, in Dr KS Palanisami vs Hindu community in general and citizens of Gobichettipalayam, has observed that courts are not entitled to ignore clear words or add something of its own or dilute the meaning of any clear word used in the Will. In the instant case, a Will was executed mutually and jointly by a husband and wife, wherein they intended to set apart the property for charity. One of the clauses in the Will provided that on the death of any of the spouse, the survivor shall enjoy the entire properties absolutely with all the rights. The husband died and later the wife had alienated some of the properties. The high court, declaring these transfers as null and void, had opined that the expression ‘absolutely’ in the Will should be read to mean that the surviving testator would have only the life interest.  In this context, an apex court bench comprising Justice AK Sikri and Justice Ashok Bhushan observed: “The solemn duty of the court is to find out the inten

While deciding in Hussain vs Union of India, the division bench of Supreme Court issued the following directions: (i) Bail applications be disposed of normally within one week; (ii) Magisterial trials, where accused are in custody, be normally concluded within six months and sessions trials, where accused are in custody, be normally concluded within two years; (iii) Efforts be made to dispose of all cases, which are five years old, by the end of the year; (iv) As a supplement to Section 436A, but consistent with the spirit thereof, if an undertrial has completed period of custody in excess of the sentence likely to be awarded if conviction is recorded, such undertrial must be released on personal bond. Such an assessment must be made by the trial courts concerned from time to time; (v) The above timelines may be the touchstone for assessment of judicial performance in annual confidential reports. emphasis added) (vi) The high courts are requested to ensure that bail applications

The Supreme Court, in IMAX Corporation vs. M/S E-CITY Entertainment, has held that Part-I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996, has no application in a case where parties chose and agreed to the arbitration being conducted outside India and the arbitration was in fact held outside India. A bench comprising Justice SA Bobde and Justice Ashok Bhushan was considering an appeal against the Bombay High Court order wherein it had held that petition to set aside an arbitral award in an arbitral proceedings held in London is maintainable before a court in India. The Court observed that, in the instant case, the parties expressly agreed that the arbitration will be conducted according to the ICC Rules of Arbitration and left the place of arbitration to be chosen by the ICC. “The relationship between the seat of arbitration and the law governing arbitration is an integral one. The seat of arbitration is defined as the juridical eat of arbitration designated by the parties, or by th

The Supreme Court, in Om Prakash vs Mishri Lal (Deceased), has reiterated that a co-owner can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object. The court made this observation in an appeal preferred against the high court order which had upheld a Rent Control Authority order negating the appellants’status of that of a landlord. “The judicially propounded proposition is that when the property forming the subject matter of eviction proceedings is owned by several co-owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and thus it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property,” a bench comprising Justice Arun Mishra and Justice Amitava Roy said. Setting aside the high court order, the court observed that the appellants being the son of the original landlord, their status as landlords for the purpose of eviction under the Uttar Pradesh

The Supreme Court, in N Paraeswaran Unni vs G Kannan, has held that a reminder notice to the drawer of the cheque cannot be construed as an admission of non-service of the first notice by the complainant. In the instant case, the complainant had issued a notice to the complainant within15 days of the cheque bouncing, but it was returned with an endorsement ‘intimation served, addressee absent’. He again sent a notice, wherein it was returned with postal endorsement “Refused, returned to sender”. The trial court allowed his complaint, which was later upheld by the first appellate court. However, the high court set aside these concurrent findings on the ground that that the statutory notice was beyond the prescribed limitation period as mentioned under Section 138 of the NI Act. On appeal, the apex court bench comprising Justice NV Ramana and Justice Prafulla C Pant observed that it is settled law that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with postal endorseme

In Sasi vs Aravindakshan Nari, the Supreme Court has issued several guidelines relating to review petitions :- 1) High courts to dispose of review petitions as expeditiously as possible. 2) An endeavour has to be made by the high courts to dispose of the applications for review with expediency. 3) It is the duty and obligation of a litigant to file a review and not to keep it defective, as if a defective petition can be allowed to remain on life support, as per his desire. 4) It is the obligation of the counsel filing an application for review to cure or remove the defects at the earliest. 5) The prescription of limitation for filing an application for review has its own sanctity. 6) The registry of the high courts has a duty to place the matter before the judge/bench with defects, so that there can be pre-emptory orders for removal of defects. 7) An adroit method cannot be adopted to file an application for review and wait till its rejection and, thereafter, challenge the orde

The Chhattisgarh High Court, in Manik Mehta vs. UCO Bank, has observed that even when the secured asset belongs to the guarantor, the borrower can also prefer an appeal to the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). In the present case, the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT) has found that under Section 17 of the Act, 2002, any person (including the borrower), aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in sub-section (4) of Section 13 may prefer an appeal to the DRT, however, in the instant case, the property of the guarantor having been auctioned, the borrower is not an aggrieved party. The DRAT had upheld the DRT order, which held that the borrower for whose credit facility the property was mortgaged has the right to challenge the recovery proceedings since the mortgager has the right to proceed against the principal borrower to realize the money that he had to pay to liquidate the dues of the principal borrower. Setting aside the DRAT order, Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra observe

The Supreme Court in Pratibha Pratisthan vs. Manager, Canara Bank held that on a plain and simple reading of all the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 it is clear that a Trust is not a person and therefore not a consumer. Consequently, it cannot be a complainant and cannot file a consumer dispute under the provisions of the Act.

State of Maharashtra Vs Suresh Vitthal Mule, R/o. Kasheli, Tal. Rajapur, Dist. Ratnagiri JUDGMENT Prakash D. Naik, J. - Heard learned APP for Appellant-State and learned counsel for the Respondent. This appeal has been preferred by invoking Section 378(1) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (`Cr.P.C.') against judgment and order dated 16 April 1999 passed by Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajapur in Summary Criminal Case No.224 of 1996. 2. The Respondent-accused was tried for the offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 of Indian Penal Code (`IPC') and Section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act. The proceedings were conducted in accordance with summary procedure as envisaged under Chapter XXI of Cr.P.C.. By judgment and order dated 16 April 1999, the Trial Court has acquitted the Respondent-accused under Section 255(1) of Cr.P.C. for the offences under Sections 279, 337, 338 of IPC and Section 184 of Motor Vehicles Act. 3. Brief facts of the prosecution case are as follo

A bench of Justice Atul Sreedharan of Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dr.B.C.Jain vs Maulana Saleem has laid down seven-point landmark guidelines for the police and the subordinate courts over handling of cases in which the government doctors are accused of patient’s death due to negligence. The seven-point guidelines issued by the court were :- 1) That, all allegations relating to negligent conduct on the part of a Government Doctor for which a prosecution u/s. 304-A IPC and/or its cognate provisions, or under such other law involving penal consequences is sought, the same shall be enquired into by a Medical Board consisting of at least three doctors, constituted by the Dean of any Government Medical College in the State of Madhya Pradesh, upon the request of the Police, Administration or the directions of a Court/Tribunal/Commission, within seven days of such requisition 2) The doctor so selected by the Dean of the Medical College concerned to sit on the Medical Board, shal

The Supreme Court, in M/s. Purohit and Company vs. Khatoonbee, has observed that though there is no limitation period to raise a claim for compensation before a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, it should be done within a reasonable time. A three-judge bench headed by Chief Justice of India JS Khehar was considering an appeal against a high court order which had upheld the justiciability of a claim petition filed 28 years after the accident took place on the ground that no period of limitation had been provided for raising a claim for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The bench agreed with the contention advanced on behalf of the appellants, that even though there may no longer be a defined period of limitation for approaching the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal to raise a claim for compensation (under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), yet a claimant must approach a court for raising such a claim within a reasonable time. The only reason stated in the c

A judicial functioning has to be done in a judicial manner, observed the Supreme Court while holding that Section 33(2) of the Stamp Act does not empower the judge of the high court to direct the officer of the high court to enquire and to find out the nature and character of the document. A three-judge bench headed by Justice Dipak Misra, in Black Pearl Hotels (Pvt) Ltd vs. Planet M Retail Ltd, observed that the duty of determination of an instrument or, to explicate, to determine when there is a contest a particular document to be of specific nature, the adjudication has to be done by the judge after hearing the counsel for the parties. It is a part of judicial function and hence, the same cannot be delegated, the bench said. The court was considering the question whether the relevant provision in the Stamp Act empowers the judge of the high court to direct the officer of the high court to enquire and to find out the nature and character of the document. The court observed that

The Delhi High Court, in ALUPRO BUILDING SYSTEMS PVT LTD vs OZONE OVERSEAS PVT LTD,  has clarified and settled that Section 21 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996, is mandatory to be complied with before reference of disputes to arbitration. The court laid down the object and purpose of issuing the notice under Section 21 holding that the Section is not limited only for the purpose of determining limitation and a party cannot straightaway file a claim before the arbitrator without issuing the notice under Section 21. The court held that in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, notice under Section 21 of the Act by the claimant invoking the arbitration clause, preceding the reference of disputes to arbitration, is mandatory. In other words, without such notice, the arbitration proceedings that are commenced would be unsustainable in law. The court also held that mere acceptance of supplies by a party on the basis of invoices containing an arbitration clause would

Can the owner of a well-known trade mark like Mercedes Benz sustain an infringement claim against an ice cream manufacturer that uses it as its corporate or trading name? This doubt was expressed by a single bench of Bombay High Court, which has been answered by the full bench holding that there is no infringement in such a case. The full bench of Bombay High Court in has held that the use of a registered trade mark as corporate name or trading name or style is excluded from the purview of Sections 29(1), 29(2) and 29(4) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, and these provisions are restricted to the use of a trade mark ‘as a trade mark’, i.e., in the ‘trade marky’ sense. The court also observed that Sections 29(4) and 29(5) operate in separate and mutually exclusive spheres, i.e., if the defendant uses the registered trade mark only as a corporate name or trading name or style in respect of dissimilar goods, a plaint can have no remedy and is not entitled to an injunction. The plaintiff

The Supreme Court in JSW Infrastructure Limited Versus Kakinada Seaports Limited, held that:- a) This Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) held that the words used in documents cannot be treated to be surplusage or superfluous or redundant and must be given some meaning and weightage. b) The law is well settled that superior courts while exercising their power of judicial review must act with restraint while dealing with contractual matters. A Three Judge Bench of this Court in Tata Cellular vs. Union of India, (1994) held that (i) there should be judicial restraint in review of administrative action; (ii) the court should not act like court of appeal; it cannot review the decision but can only review the decision making process (iii) the court does not usually have the necessary expertise to correct such technical decisions.; (iv) the employer must have play in the joints i.e., necessary freedom to take administrative decisions within

The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rahul Jain Vs Smt. Namrata Jain has held that the jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to correct all errors of a judgment of a Court acting within its limitation. Such jurisdiction can be “exercised where the orders is passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice”, the court observed. The court upheld the order of trial court that dismissed an application filed by the petitioner under Order 16 Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code to summon a particular witness in his divorce case.  The court found on the date the issues were framed in the divorce case the petitioner did not filed any list of witnesses nor made any request to summon a particular witness. Justice Vandana Kasrekar held the trial court has not passed the order “in violation of fundamental principles of law and justice warranting interference of this Court under Articl

The Delhi High Court in Kanoria Industries vs Union Of India held that a review petition is maintainable before the high court after the special leave petition (SPL) is dismissed as withdrawn by the Supreme Court. A division bench of Justice Badar Durrez Ahmed and Justice Rajiv Sahai Endlaw was disposing of the preliminary objection to the very maintainability of a review petition on the ground that the SLP preferred against the order of which review is sought was dismissed.  A review was sought of the judgment dated 13th July, 2012, of dismissal of the writ petition.... The petitioners preferred SLP(C) No.31982/2012 against the said judgment, which came up before the Supreme Court on 7th December, 2012, and the following order was passed:  “Upon hearing counsel, the Court made the following order. After some arguments, counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the special leave petition with liberty to the petitioner to move the High Court in a review